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Dale Turner's paper "Fallacies and the Concept of an Argument" examines
some recent theories of fallacious reasoning. Not only is Professor Turner
interested in these theories in their own right, but also in the theories of
argument of which they are a part. If a certain theory of fallacies goes down, he
notices, it often takes a theory of argument down with it. Turner looks at four
different accounts of the concept of fallacy. He finds some truth in each of the
theories but ultimately rejects them and constructs an alternative account. In
this commentary, I first briefly summarize the four approaches he mentions,
and his criticisms of them. In passing, I discuss why I do not think that his
objections hold up against the Fogelin/Duggan approach, the third alternative
he looks at. In contrast to Turner, I do not think there is much that is problematic
about textbook lists of commonly committed fallacies. I end my commentary by
raising two objections to his alternative account of fallacies.
Turner first criticizes what he calls the "standard treatment", as expressed by
Hamblin. This account says that a fallacy is an argument that "seems to be
valid but is not so". Turner thinks that the standard approach has several good
aspects--especially the way it anticipates his idea that a fallacy tempts us into
thinking that it is a good argument. Like Hamblin and others, however, Turner
also sees problems with the standard approach. Turner's main objection to it is
that its concept of "fallacy" is too narrow. The standard treatment considers
fallacies to be bad arguments and what it means by bad arguments are
formally invalid arguments. Turner, however, rejects the idea of evaluating
arguments in terms of their formal validity or lack of it. According to Turner,
valid arguments are not necessarily good arguments--they may beg the
question, for example--and invalid arguments are not necessarily bad
arguments. For example, many inductive arguments are good arguments,
though formally invalid. The argument he presents about the oil on the driveway
is a good example of an argument that is both formally invalid but non-
fallacious.
It is at this point that Turner introduces a theme that he develops throughout his
whole paper: that a fallacy theorist should construct a theory of fallacies based
on the way the word "fallacy" is actually used instead of trying to make all
fallacies fit some antecedent theory that one has about what a fallacy is or is
not. The standard approach presumes, antecedently, a deductivist model of
what good and bad arguments are, paying no attention to the set of argument
forms that philosophers and others have traditionally called fallacies. This is not
to say, however, that Turner supports the traditional list of fallacies; he is
saying, rather, that a good theory has to be able to account for the continued
attention they receive in philosophy.
Next Turner turns to the pragma-dialectical approach. This approach sees
rational thinking not as an end in itself but as a tool to settle disputes. While
Turner sees some good things in this theory, he ultimately rejects it and does
so for two reasons: First, he does not think that the pragma-dialectical
approach does justice to the fact that one can commit a fallacy when reasoning
with oneself. His second objection is that fallacies cannot be strictly identified
with bad moves in conflict resolution because some bad moves--while
counterproductive--are not fallacies. One example of such a move would be
switching to a language that the other does not understand in the middle of an
intellectual argument.
As was the case with the standard treatment, the core mistake that the
pragma-dialectal treatment makes goes to the concept of argument of which it
is a part. The purpose of argument in the pragma-dialectical approach is
rational dispute resolution. Turner reminds us that arguments have multiple
purposes: they also play a key role in rational inquiry, exploration and rational
discourse between two or more people. Turner neatly sums up his objections
to the pragma-dialectical view of argument in this way: dispute resolution is
closer to negotiation than reasoning.
The third approach is the Fogelin/Duggan approach. Of all the approaches, as
I have said, I find this to be the most promising. This approach prides itself on
being able to account for the wide range of things called "fallacies". Fogelin
and Duggan define a fallacy as a belief-fixing procedure that has "a high
tendency to produce false or unfounded beliefs".
Turner has two objections to this approach--neither of which is convincing, in
my opinion. Turner's first objection is that by calling a fallacy a "tendency", one
is suggesting that no particular instance of a fallacy would necessarily be a bad
argument. Yet, he says, the Fogelin/Duggan approach clearly favours talking
about fallacies as abstract argument forms.
I do not think this is a good objection. I agree that an abstract fallacy form is
incomplete without a context and that in some contexts it may be possible to
produce a good argument with such a form. But for all of that, I argue, it is still
useful to be aware of argument forms that tend, in most contexts, to produce
bad arguments. This is a crucial point. It is on this basis that Turner decides
that there is no formal reality to fallacies--that they are essentially local and
context-bound and cannot be talked about in the abstract. I believe that
Turner's mistake is analogous to someone's saying, in the field of ethics, that
one can never say that lying is immoral because one can always think of a
case where lying might be one's best alternative. True--sometimes telling a lie
might be the best thing to do. But it does not follow from this that lying cannot
be said to be generally immoral. And it likewise does not follow that some
argument forms, minus their context, cannot still be called "fallacies".
Turner's second objection to the Fogelin/Duggan view is that Fogelin and
Duggan should never have, on their account, endorsed traditional lists of
fallacies. Why? Because, according to Turner, what are traditionally called
fallacies may not, as a matter of fact, be argument patterns that tend to
produce false or unfounded beliefs. The reason Turner gives for raising such a
doubt is again his point that in some circumstances, arguments that are
supposedly fallacious in form actually constitute good arguments. The one
example he provides, however,--the argument about the rain and the aluminum
roof--is problematic. It is supposed to be an argument from ignorance that is
not fallacious. My problem with his example is that I do not see the argument as
an argument from ignorance. In an argument from ignorance, one says that
because you can not disprove what I am saying, what I am saying is true.
Turner's "rain argument" does not fit that pattern. Rather, the argument is
almost a classic modus tollens or denial of the consequent:
If it were raining, you would hear a loud pinging (on the aluminum roof).
There is no loud pinging.
Therefore it is not raining.
Turner, then, doubts whether traditional, textbook fallacies, as a matter of fact,
have a tendency to lead one rationally astray. I suggest that Turner needs to
provide evidence for his doubt and that so far he has not done so. Until it is
provided, I see no reason to doubt that ad hominems, appeals to popularity,
hasty generalizations and the like are in fact patterns of argument that, as
Fogelin and Duggan say, more often than not produce beliefs that are either
false or unfounded.
I thus continue to see the Fogelin/Duggan definition of a fallacy as still being a
strong one, though, unlike Turner and like Wreen, who I am about to turn to, I
think that Fogelin and Duggan ought to be talking about "arguments" rather
than "belief-fixing procedures". I will say more about this, later.
Wreen's approach, then, is the fourth one that Turner mentions. The main
aspects of Wreen's approach, for Turner's purposes, are (1) that it restricts
fallacies to "bad inferences" or to "inferences that should not be made" and (2)
that it suggests that it is not possible to create a list of fallacious argument
types, because the context of an argument is all important and contexts cannot
be formalized. Turner raises two objections to Wreen's approach. First, Turner
points out that fallacies are not always bad inferences. One example would be
attacking a strawman. Second, Wreen's account is unable to distinguish
pathological arguments from fallacious ones, both of which make inferences
that should not be made.
Turner's own account borrows from each of the above approaches. From the
standard approach, as defined by Hamblin, a fallacy is something we are
tempted to make; from the pragma-dialectical approach, and from Wreen, he
recognizes the importance of context. From the Fogelin/Duggan and Wreen's
approaches, he endorses the idea of that there are a wide diversity of the
things we call fallacies and that they, as opposed to some antecedent theory of
a fallacy, ought to be our guide in constructing a theory of fallacies. Finally, also
from Wreen, Turner supports the idea that there can be no sacrosanct list of
fallacious categories. From all these pieces, then, Turner puts together his own
theory of what a fallacy is. There are four parts to his definition. A fallacy is (1)
an important mistake, (2) of a cognitive nature, (3) that we are tempted to
make and (4) which occurs in a context of reasoning.
What are we to make of Turner's alternative account? I think it is a good
attempt to define what a fallacy is. But there are two problems with Turner's
theory. My first and biggest objection to his definition does not concern the
definition of fallacy itself, but what Turner thinks logically flows from it. It is a
problem I have already mentioned above, namely that it belittles the
importance of gathering, listing and categorizing fallacious argument forms.
Above, we saw that one reason he criticizes fallacy-lists is that fallacies are
context-bound and lists can not capture context. I tried to show what was wrong
with this by my ethics analogy. Now, Turner gives us more detailed account of
why he thinks that traditional fallacy lists are problematic: what is and is not a
fallacy he says, is partly a function of the individual's level of competence and
what the individual finds tempting or not. I agree with Turner that the notion of
"temptation" has a place in fallacy-theory but I do not think that the concept is
as subjective--that is, related to the individual and his or her competence--as
he does.
Turner argues, for example, that an accusation of a fallacy in a pedagogical
context is different from one in an academic context. In a pedagogical context,
he says, the accusation of a fallacy points to a genuine incompetence in the
student while the accusation of a fallacy in an academic setting is never taken
as a refutation, rather it is either taken as something like a request for further
discussion and clarification, or as an indication of deep disagreement.
There are two problems here: The first is that Professor Turner is over-
generalizing about why people commit fallacies and the kind they commit. I
suggest that incompetence in reasoning is not the only reason that people,
whether they be professors or anyone else, commit fallacies. People from
every corner, even those who are otherwise competent thinkers, may commit
fallacies because of laziness, cowardice, complacency, bias, habitualness,
greed or spite. Maybe they are in a state of depression or despair. Maybe they
are becoming more stubborn as they get older. Maybe they are tired, stressed
or intoxicated. Maybe they are angry. So I think that Professor Turner is
forgetting about how even the best of thinkers can commit simple fallacies just
like everyone else. My second point concerns the relevance of the fact, if it is
one, that the significance of being charged with committing a fallacy differs
according to who is charged and what the context is. I fail to see how that
would affect the evaluation of the reasoning under question. An ad hominem is
still an ad hominem, whether it comes from the logic professor, an
undergraduate student, or someone who has almost no formal education.
My second complaint with Turner's definition has to do with its attempt to shift
fallacy-theory away from "bad arguments" to the wider category of "cognitive
mistakes within a reasoning process". I do not think he justifies his position
and I think his new category of fallacy is too wide. His case for the shift from
bad arguments to cognitive mistakes rests entirely on his understanding of two
examples: the so-called hardware fallacy and the so-called fallacy of opting for
the medium instead of the mean as a measure of a central tendency. Each of
these can plausibly be called fallacies--yet they cannot, according to Turner, be
characterized as arguments. Turner just does not say enough about these
alleged fallacies, however, and why he thinks, along with Fogelin and Duggan,
that they are so difficult to fit into usual fallacy categories. Is the hardware
fallacy, or the medium-instead of the mean fallacy, as he understands them,
committed in a context of reasoning in the sense of reasoning that is used in
his definition? If so, then these fallacies can each be described as a procedure
whose rationale consists of one or more bad arguments--thus fitting the pattern
of a fallacies as bad-argument forms. If they are not committed in a reasoning
context then Turner expanded his theory for no good reason since, by his own
account, they would not be fallacies in any interesting sense to the argument
theorist.
My second objection against Turner's attempt to shift fallacy-theory away from
bad arguments to cognitive mistakes is that in doing so, Turner is creating a
category of "fallacy" that is too wide, given what the purpose of fallacy-talk
ought to be. I agree with Turner that any important intellectual mistake we are
tempted to make in a reasoning context can rightly be called a fallacy. A
common, faulty argument-pattern, however, is a also a fallacy, but in a different
sense. It is this second sense of the word "fallacy" that is of value to practical
argument theory. By folding both senses of "fallacy" into one category,
something important gets lost.
What now falls under Turner's category of a fallacy is, for example, almost
every philosophical mistake discovered in the history of philosophy. If
Wittgenstein is right, a lot of thinkers in philosophy commit what might be
called the failure-to-command-a-clear-view-of-the-way-language-functions
fallacy. If Plato is right, many people commit what might be called the visible-
things-instead-of-Forms fallacy. If Hume is right that ideas extend no further
than experience, then many people commit what might be called the
"metaphysical fallacy". All of these--if they were actual mistakes--would not only
fall under Turner's category of important cognitive mistakes we are tempted to
make in a reasoning context, but would become paradigm examples of
fallacies, in his sense.
What would be wrong with this? I think it would take us too far away from the
main purposes of fallacy-talk, which is to help us reason better and teach
reasoning to others. Fallacy-talk at its best provides us with neat summaries of
where we often go wrong and of where we need the most reminding. I know
that Turner disagrees and I am aware that I merely stating my thesis here more
than defending it. I agree that existing lists of fallacies can always be improved
upon. But to replace these lists of traditional fallacies with the kinds of deep,
complicated, multi-layered mistakes that philosophers discover is to squeeze
out of the picture one of philosophy's shining achievements: that list of logical
mistakes, found at the beginning of many introduction-to-philosophy books,
that both academics and people at large make in their everyday arguments.
There is a use in philosophy for that list. The kind of simple fallacies it points to
should be distinguished, for practical purposes, from the deep intellectual
mistakes that are discussed in first philosophy--otherwise they will get lost in
the mix.
 
